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Abstract 
This paper explores optimal biofuel subsidies in a general equilibrium trade model.  The focus is 
on the production of biofuels such as corn-based ethanol, which diverts corn from use as food.  
In the small-country case, when a Pigouvian tax on conventional fuels is in place, the optimal 
biofuel subsidy is zero.  When the tax on crude is not available as a policy option, however, a 
second-best biofuel subsidy (or tax) is optimal.  In the large-country case, a biofuel subsidy spurs 
global demand for food and confers a terms-of-trade benefit to the food-exporting nation.  In the 
absence of beggar-thy-neighbor trade policy tools, the twin objectives of pollution reduction and 
term-of-trade improvement justify a combination of crude tax and biofuel subsidy for the food 
exporter.  If the food importer also uses a biofuel subsidy (or tax), we have a Johnson (1953) 
type Nash equilibrium augmented by pollution considerations.  If biofuel subsidies reduce global 
crude use, then in a Nash equilibrium, the food-exporting nation must use a subsidy, while a 
food-importing nation will impose a subsidy if and only if the pollution-reduction effect 
dominates the terms-of-trade effect.  
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1. Introduction 
The literature on trade and the environment has proceeded largely along two paths.  One 
strand of the literature has examined the impact of trade itself on pollution (see Copeland and 
Taylor, 1994, 2003).  It has highlighted the fact that by fostering economic growth, trade can 
have two opposing effects on environmental quality.  On the one hand, the higher output 
resulting from trade would contribute to pollution (the “scale” effect).1  On the other hand, 
higher income would result in greater demand for a cleaner environment and might, therefore, 
result in the adoption of pollution-reducing technologies (the “technique” effect).2,3  A second 
strand of the literature has modeled strategic interactions between two trading partners.  An 
important conclusion drawn by this line of inquiry is that, contrary to popular wisdom, it might 
not be optimal for a government to impose weak environmental standards on domestic industries 
to give them a competitive advantage.  Strict standards might instead be optimal if firms compete 
in prices (Barrett, 1994).   
There is a gap in the trade and environment literature in that it does not account for the 
policy challenges presented by the use of biofuels, especially bioethanol.  In the current 
economic and political environment this is an extremely important omission.  As recently as 
October 13, 2010, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) raised the 30-year-old cap of 10 
percent ethanol blend in fuel for ordinary cars to 15 percent (known as E15) for models 2007 
onward (see NYTimes and WSJ, 10/13/2010).  Testing is going on for safety of use for such 
blends in cars of 2001 to 2006 vintages, to see whether this policy change can soon be extended 
                                                 
1 If, however, pollution quotas are enforced through the issuance of a fixed number of pollution permits, the 
environmental impact of trade liberalization might be negligible.  Further, it can be shown that if pollution taxes are 
adjusted to equate the marginal cost of pollution with the marginal benefits of the associated production, the net 
impact on pollution is indeterminate (Lopez, 1994; Rauscher, 1997; Copeland and Taylor, 2003).  
2 Empirical evidence suggests that the effects of rising income might be the stronger driver of the trade-environment 
relationship, resulting in a positive impact of trade on environment in higher-income countries (Frankel and Rose, 
2005). 
3 See Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001). 
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to them.  Coincidentally, there is a major concern at this time about rising corn prices, 
precipitated in part by unfavorable weather conditions.  Corn prices have surged after the US 
Agriculture Department recently forecast this year’s crop to be 3 percent lower than of 2009 (see 
NY Times, 10/12/2010).  Interestingly, the aforementioned article notes:  
“The crop will still probably be the third-largest on record, but demand for corn to 
be used as animal feed on American farms, in ethanol production and for exports 
remains high, so supplies are expected to be tight.”  
 
This report, among others, suggests that the role of demand coming from both the export markets 
and from ethanol production is crucial to determination of corn prices.4  One of the central 
contributions of this paper is to provide a general equilibrium model that helps us to think about 
the price effects of such policy changes, and how they may be seen in terms of what economists 
consider to be first-best or second-best policies.   
Policies to promote the use of biofuels cannot be discussed in isolation from two related 
issues.  First, it is generally accepted that the growth of the biofuel industry in all countries 
except Brazil, where it has attained scale economies, is contingent on significant subsidy.5 
Second, given the energy inefficiency of biofuels, an aggressive strategy to promote its use can 
lead to a significant increase in the world prices of food items.6  Among other problems, this 
                                                 
4 Also see NY Times (10/13/10), and WSJ (10/13/10).  
5 In the U.S., where bioethanol production is corn based, the break-even price for petroleum is $54 per barrel, and in 
Europe, where bioethanol production is wheat based, the break-even price is $72 per barrel (Larson, 2008).  The U.S. 
government provides a subsidy of 51 cents per gallon to producers of bioethanol.  In Germany, where the growth of 
the production and use of biofuels was among the fastest in EU member countries, biofuel producers not only enjoy 
a 35% tax advantage vis-a-vis the producers of traditional fuels, but the state also subsidizes construction of biofuel 
production units up to 50%.  Not to be left behind, the Australian government has waived the excise duty on fuel 
production for producers of bioethanol until 2011. 
6 For example, corn-based ethanol has 57% energy efficiency while petroleum has 81% efficiency. OECD (2006) 
estimates suggest that, to account for 10% of vehicular fuel, 60-70% of the current crop area in the U.S., Canada, 
and the EU-15 countries would have to be devoted to crops that can be used to produce ethanol.  On the demand side 
the NY Times (10/12/10) piece reports that December corn futures on the Chicago Board of Trade reached a high of 
$5.84 a bushel (on 10/12/10), this is up from $3.43 per bushel recorded in June for similar corn futures.  The same 
article reports that Don Roose, president of US commodities, a consulting and brokerage firm in West Des Moines, 
Iowa, said that the government’s latest harvest forecast suggests that corn supplies into next year will be 
“precariously tight”.  He is also reported to say that “At these levels, we have to cut back on our usage…We can 
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second issue can be quite devastating for the developing nations.7  Developed countries would be 
affected also if, as projected, there is a steep increase in the prices of staple items like corn and 
wheat.  Such projections clearly warrant a discussion about the efficacy of opting for biofuel 
subsidies.8 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a benchmark to think about biofuel subsidies 
within the context of international trade and pollution, where trade policies cannot be used due to 
conflicts with WTO rules.  The analysis does not tell us how governments actually behave, rather, 
it informs us on how governments should behave if they were to focus simply on economic 
efficiency.  Pollution is treated here as a global public good because fossil fuels contribute 
(arguably) to atmospheric change.  To simplify the analysis we treat a homogeneous food item 
like corn to have two potential uses.  The first is direct consumption as food.  The second is to 
use as an intermediate input in the production of energy.  The other intermediate input used to 
produce energy is crude oil.  Energy itself is treated as a non-traded commodity because of 
difficulties in shipping it across large distances.  The focus of the analysis is on two nations, one 
of which (say US) exports corn, while the other (say China or Brazil) imports corn in exchange 
for manufacturing exports.  The supply of crude comes from a third nation (say the Middle East), 
which is blackboxed here through the assumption that the price of crude is fixed.  Consequently, 
the terms-of-trade that we consider is between food and manufacturing, where the latter is treated 
as the numeraire good.   
                                                                                                                                                             
either cut back on our exports, our ethanol consumption, or our feed”.  Taken together these facts suggest that a 
policy change favoring ethanol production can have significant effects on corn prices.    
7 Runge and Senauer (2007) have argued that by pushing up the price of crops that are staples for the world’s poor 
population, by 2025 biofuels could nearly double the number of people who are chronically hungry. 
8 By contrast, the discussion in the trade and environment literature largely involves policies that either cap pollution 
through fiat and permits or raise the cost of producing the polluting good (see Copeland and Taylor, 2004, for a 
discussion). 
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To keep the analysis simple, we assume that the use of crude in energy production is 
polluting, while the use of corn in making energy is not.9   The analysis proceeds in three parts.  
In the first, we consider a small open economy facing given prices of all the traded goods.  The 
only market failure here stems from the pollution externality created by crude use in energy 
production, which can be corrected by an appropriate tax on crude.  If the tax on crude is not 
available because of political economy considerations, the second-best policy may be a tax rather 
than a subsidy on biofuel.  The intuition is the following.  A subsidy on the use of corn in making 
energy (which may take the form of subsidizing the use of corn based ethanol in say the E15 fuel 
we have discussed above) reduces the relative input price of corn and raises its use along an 
energy isoquant (while reducing crude use through the net substitution effect).  On the other hand, 
this input subsidy reduces the unit cost of production of energy, which is passed on to consumers 
in the form of a lower price of energy.  The consequent rise in energy demand raises the demand 
for crude, and if this effect overwhelms the aforementioned substitution effect, crude use and 
pollution will rise.10   
The second part of this paper deals with the case where the terms-of-trade for food is 
endogenous to the system (i.e., the nations trading food for manufacturing are large).  However, 
we continue to assume throughout this paper that the crude price measured in terms of the 
numeraire good is given exogenously.11  In this context, we consider welfare-maximizing crude 
tax and biofuel subsidy combination for the food-exporting nation (the other nation is assumed to 
be passive).  Unlike the small open economy case, a biofuel subsidy (or tax) may be optimal 
                                                 
9 This assumption keeps the analysis clean without sacrificing the basic thrust of our results as long as crude use is 
assumed to be more polluting than biofuel use.  The point of this paper is not to justify bioethanol policies, but to 
suggest that even if they are clean, they can still be misused compared to first or second-best benchmarks.  Of course, 
if they are more polluting than crude, then our arguments about possible misallocations caused by such policies are 
strengthened. 
10 A similar effect is noted in a related literature surveyed by de Gorter and Just (2010), although our demand side 
mechanism in this general equilibrium trade model is different.  
11 This simplifies the analysis considerably.  With three tradables and two relative prices, the analysis is 
considerably more complex in such a framework.  Given that the variability of the price of crude is not a major 
focus of this analysis, this is a reasonable abstraction. 
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even in the presence of a crude tax.  The reason is that while the crude tax can target pollution, it 
is useful to have the biofuel subsidy to raise the net demand for food and confer terms-of-trade 
gains to the exporting nation.  Effectively, in a world where beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies 
cannot be used, biofuel subsidies may instead be used for a similar purpose.       
The final part of the paper deals with competitive use of biofuel policies by the exporter 
and also the importer of food.  The result is a Johnson (1953) type Nash policy equilibrium, 
augmented to consider pollution as a global public good.  Instead of using imports tariffs, the 
nations use biofuel subsidies to target both pollution and terms-of-trade.  Thus, the food-
exporting nation will want to use biofuel subsidies to boost global demand for food, while the 
food-importing nation will want to tax biofuels to reduce its net global demand.  Of course, if the 
pollution motive dominates, the importing nation may use a biofuel subsidy, however its level 
will be moderated by terms-of-trade considerations.  In contrast, the pollution motive and the 
terms-of-trade motive complement each other for the food exporter.    
        
2. The Benchmark Case: A Small Open Economy 
Let us consider a small open economy with representative consumers.  Each consumer 
maximizes utility given by ( , , , )U U F E M G    , where F , E , M , and G are consumption levels 
of food, energy, a manufactured good, and clean environment, respectively.  M is the numeraire 
good.  If p is the price of food and q is the price of energy, the expenditure function is 
),,1,,( Guqpe   Min ,~~~ MEqFp  subject to ( , , , )u U F E M G    ,   (1) 
which yields the usual Hicksian demand functions.  In addition, 0ue 12 and 0 GuG Uee .13    
                                                 
12 Throughout the paper we use the convention that unless specified otherwise, i and ij  are, respectively, the first- 
and second-order partial derivatives of any function ( , ) i jx x .   
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In this economy, all commodities are produced using constant returns to scale (CRS).   
Food (F) is produced using labor ( FL ) and land (T ).  Assuming that land is specific to food and 
that its endowment is given, we have 
( , ) ( ),F FF F L T f L   where (.) 0f    and (.) 0f   .      (2) 
Competitive profit maximization ensures that (.)'pfw  , implying that ( , )F FL L p w .   
Similarly, the manufactured good is produced using labor ( ML ) and energy ( ME ): 
( , )M MM M L E .          (3) 
The profit maximization conditions are ),( MML ELMw  and ),( MME ELMq  .  Labor supply is 
given at L , such that 
F ML L L  .           (4) 
Finally, energy is produced using food for biofuel (B) and crude oil (R) – our proxy for fossil 
fuel.  All of R is assumed to be imported at a given price r: 
)R,B(EE  .          (5) 
The corresponding profit maximization conditions equate the net input prices to the values of 
their marginal products.   
 
2.1  Optimal Subsidy on Biofuel and an Optimal Tax on Crude 
 The government subsidizes the use of biofuel (B) such that its input price in energy 
production, net of subsidy s, is spps  .  Also, the government uses a tax t on crude, so the 
domestic price of crude is trr d  .  Finally, we assume that although all activities are 
potentially polluting, the damage to the environment is larger when crude oil is used to produce 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 Consider quasi-linear preferences and separability of G: ( , ) ( )U F E M G      .  The expenditure function 
associated with this utility function is:  ( , , , ) ( , ) ( , ) [ ( , ), ( , )] Ge p q u G pF p q qE p q u F p q E p q         , which 
implies ( , )pe F p q  , ( , )Eqe p q  , 1ue  , ( ) 0Ge G    , and 0pu que e  . 
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energy.   Further, noting that in the small country case crude used by the rest of the world ( *R ) is 
given for the domestic nation, we model clean environment as a decreasing function of the 
amount of crude used in this economy14  
  *G G R R  ,  . 0;G  given *,R  G G R , ( ) 0G R  .  (6) 
The obvious policy implication is that if the government wants to improve environmental quality, 
it would have to reduce the use of crude in energy production, ceteris paribus.  It is also evident 
from the above discussion that the instruments available to achieve this change are the subsidy 
for biofuel and the tax on crude.    
 The expenditure-revenue identity for this economy (equivalently, its trade balance 
equation) is given by 
.),(),()(),,1,,( MMMF qErRpBRBqEELMLpfGuqpe          (7) 
Given the difficulties in trading energy over long distances in its final form, we assume that E is 
a nontraded good, with its price determined by the zero profit condition: 
 ( , ,1) ( , ), ,  and s d s t
B Rq C p r q q s t q q
E E
      ,     (8) 
where (.)C  is the unit cost of producing energy.  The assumption of CRS implies that 
tRsBrRpBqE  .  Substituting this expression in (7), and using (8), total differentiation 
of (7) yields 
( )u Ge du sdB t e G dR    ,        (9) 
where the first term on the right-hand side is the loss due to the distortion in input use, and the 
second term is the net benefit due to the reduction of crude use.  From (9), the optimal subsidy 
condition is 
                                                 
14 An alternative would be to propose that G is a function of biofuel and crude, with biofuel being relatively less 
polluting.  To keep the model simple, we assume that while crude is polluting, biofuel is not.    
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0u
ue
s
   ( )
opt s
G
s
Rs t e G
B
  .15         (10) 
Using (10),  
( ) 0 0opts tu G t G
s
R Bue t e G R t e G
t B
            
, assuming .0
s
ts
t B
BRR  (11) 
Notice that Ge Gmeasures the amount of the numeraire good that the consumer will need to be 
compensated for a unit rise in R (and hence pollution).  Therefore, using (10) and (11), it is clear 
that the optimal crude tax is the Pigouvian tax, which equals the marginal damage from pollution.  
Also, when this tax is in place, the optimal biofuel subsidy is zero.   
 
Proposition 1:  In a small open economy that produces energy using crude oil (which is 
polluting) and biofuel (assumed to be clean), the optimal policy is to use a Pigouvian tax on 
crude equaling its marginal damage to the environment.  The optimal biofuel subsidy is zero 
when such a tax is in place.   
 
The above finding is not surprising because, in a small open economy, the only source of 
market failure is the environmental externality of crude production.  An appropriate tax is 
enough to rectify this failure, and no other instrument is necessary.  This is a useful benchmark 
for the analysis and results below, where we extend the model to consider situations where either 
a tax is not available as an instrument or other externalities exist (such as a terms-of-trade 
externality) that the tax instrument cannot address fully.     
   
                                                 
15 Part B of the appendix derives sR , tR , sB  and tB  for both the small- and the large-country cases using a quasi-
linear utility function that is also separable in G.  This provides a tractable example, and there is no loss in generality.  
Indeed, the analysis in the text is for general utility functions.  Details of derivations for the general case, which 
allows for income effects, are available from the authors on request.   
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2.2  Second-Best Biofuel Subsidy (when a crude tax is not feasible) 
 A tax on crude might not be available as a policy instrument, perhaps because of the 
country’s political economy.16  On the other hand, the presence of a strong agricultural lobby can 
make biofuels attract policy attention.  Consider ethanol produced from corn, which is mixed 
with crude to make the final fuel.  Although the efficiency of making corn-based ethanol is 
questionable, it is quite popular in the United States because it is good for the corn belt states like 
Iowa and Minnesota and draws support from both the agricultural and ethanol producing 
lobbies.17  The analysis below describes the biofuel subsidy as a second-best instrument. 
  Using 0t   in (9),  
0u
ue
s
  
SB s
G
s
Rs e G
B
  ,        (12) 
where SBs  is the second-best biofuel subsidy.  Note that 
(.) (.) (.) .sr r rpR C E dR C dE EC ds           (13) 
Also, total energy use must equal the amount used as an input in the manufacturing sector plus 
the amount used directly in consumption: 
 , ( ),1, , ( ) ( , )MqE e p q s u G R E p q  18  Mqq q qu qGdE e E dq e du e G dR     . (14) 
Using (13) and (14), 
   sMqq q s qG qurpdE e E q EC e G ds e du       , where,  1 1 .r qGC G e    (15) 
Using (8), note that when 0t  , )(sqq   and .0 EBqs  Using this fact, along with (13) 
and (15), we have  
                                                 
16 We do not pursue an explicit political economy analysis in this paper.  It is possible to do that in future work 
along the lines of Fredriksson (1997), among others.  
17 See for example, WSJ (10/13/10), which states “The cause of boosting ethanol use in cars has been strongly 
championed by Growth Energy, an ethanol trade group led by Wesley Clark, the retired army general and 2004 
Democratic presidential candidate.”   
18 The zero profit condition in manufacturing is ( , ,1) 1 M MC w q p .  This implies that ( )w w q and that 
( ) M ME w q L .   Using (2) and (4),  , ( ) ( , ) M M ML L p w q L p q .  Thus, ( , )M ME E p q . 
 10
  ,YdudsZAqdR s                  (16) 
where ( ) 0Mqq q rA e E C   , 0srpZ EC   , and qu rY e C .19,20  At the utility-maximizing 
,s  0du   and 
   .s sR Aq Z                                                                                                                 (17) 
 Following a similar set of steps as above, we can compute the impact on food demand of 
a biofuel subsidy: 
  ,duYdsZqAdB FFsF                  (18) 
where ( ) 0sF Mqq qpA C e E   , ( ) 0s s s sF qGrp p p pZ E C e G C C     ,21 and spquF CeY  .  Once 
again, at the utility-maximizing subsidy rate, 0du   and  
0.F Fs sB A q Z                    (19) 
Using (17) and (19) in (12) (i.e., after taking into account the impact of the subsidy on the use of 
crude and the demand for biofuel for energy production), the second-best subsidy is 
0SB sG F F
s
Aq Zs e G
A q Z
    iff 0s sAq Z R   .     (20) 
 
Proposition 2:  In the absence of a tax on crude, the second-best policy is to subsidize the use of 
biofuel if and only if the cross input substitution effect in energy production overcomes the 
subsidy’s scale effect via a reduction in the price of energy.     
 
                                                 
19 It can be shown that A < 0 if  < 0, which is the case when  GququGqG UeeUe   is small. 
20 Note that in the two-input case, concavity of the cost function requires that the cross effect is strictly positive. 
21 We assume here that the environment-generated income effect on energy demand (i.e., eqG ) is sufficiently small, 
such that the own-price effect s sp pC  dominates. 
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The term sAq captures the scale effect of the subsidy on crude demand, while Z  is the 
cross-substitution effect between the two inputs in energy production.  The latter effect is easy to 
understand.  The biofuel subsidy reduces the relative price of biofuel, thereby providing an 
incentive to substitute biofuel for crude in the production of energy.  Its magnitude depends on 
the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs.  Consider now the scale effect.  The subsidy 
reduces the net input price of biofuel.  This is passed on as a reduction in energy price, which 
stimulates the aggregate demand for energy, which in turn raises production (the scale effect).  
The net impact of these two effects is ex ante ambiguous and is determined by demand-side 
parameters and the aforementioned elasticity of substitution.  If technology is Leontief type, for 
example, the cross-substitution effect will disappear altogether.  In such a case, the demand for 
crude would unambiguously increase with a subsidy, and a government that aims to improve 
environmental quality should tax biofuel rather than subsidize it.  On the other hand, the demand 
for food as an input in energy production would rise because of the own-price substitution effect 
– as energy producers substitute biofuel for crude – and the scale effect that increases the 
demand for energy itself.22 
 The proposition highlights the fact that biofuel subsidies might not be innocuous.  Just as 
economic growth associated with trade has a “scale” effect that might increase pollution, 
subsidization of biofuels might increase pollution by increasing the demand for energy.  Notice, 
however, that in our model, the rise in the demand for energy is not from a pure income effect.  
Rather, it is a consequence of a price effect that spurs energy demand. 
 
                                                 
22 One would, of course, also have to consider the impact of the resultant change in environmental quality on energy 
demand, but it would be reasonable to assume that this effect would be of second-order importance and would be 
dominated by the own-price substitution effect. 
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3. The Large-Country Case 
The small-country assumption retained up to this point requires that the price for food 
(i.e., p) is given exogenously by the world market.  An important issue regarding biofuel 
subsidies is that they encourage alternate uses of food products, thus reducing the net availability 
of food and raising its price in the global market.  This issue can be modeled in the context of a 
large open economy where the food price is endogenous.  If the subsidy raises the net global 
demand for food, its international price will rise, conferring terms-of-trade gains to the food-
exporting nation.  In addition, following the logic of the previous sections, such a subsidy will 
also affect pollution.   
 Suppose that there are three nations: home, foreign, and the rest of the world (ROW).    
The home country exports food to the foreign country and imports a manufactured good from it.  
It also imports crude from the ROW at a given terms-of-trade r and pays in terms of the 
manufactured good (the numeraire).  Thus, the home trade balance requires that the value of its 
food exports must equal the value of its net imports of the manufactured good.  The latter equals 
the sum of home consumption of the manufactured good and its payment to the ROW for crude, 
net of home production of the manufactured good.  Analogously, the foreign country’s net export 
of the manufactured good equals its production minus the sum of its consumption demand and 
payment to the ROW (for crude).  Finally, the ROW is assumed to not have any domestic 
consumption of crude, and its only role in the model is to provide crude to the home and foreign 
countries in exchange for the manufactured good.23  Home and foreign trade balance conditions 
are, respectively, 
MrRMpX  ~  and ,~ **** MrRMpX        (21)  
                                                 
23 This structure lends tractability to the model.  Admittedly, allowing for price of crude to be endogenous and for 
the ROW to consume crude are realistic assumptions, but they come at the cost of complicating an already-complex 
analysis.  The central points that we make are intuitive and can be made without adding to the model’s complexity.  
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where BefX p   and **** BefX p   are their net exports of food.24 
 
3.1  Optimal Policy: The One-Sided Case 
 This subsection considers optimal policy choice for the home nation, where the foreign 
nation is passive (i.e., when * * 0s t  ).  In the presence of a home tax t on crude and a subsidy 
s on biofuel, the home expenditure-revenue relationship is 
.),(),()(),,1,,( MMMF qErRpBRBqEELMLpfGuqpe     (22)  
Noting that in the large-country case *R is endogenous, (6) has to be replaced by *( )G G R R  .  
We differentiate (22) to get  
*( ) .u G Ge du Xdp sdB t e G dR e G dR            (23)  
Equation (23) is similar to (9) in the small open-economy case, with two important differences.  
The first is the terms-of-trade effect, which is captured by the first term on the right-hand-side of 
(23).  Home’s utility will rise to the tune of a rise in the price of food (i.e., dp ) weighted by its 
level of food export (i.e., X).  The second critical difference (compared with the small-country 
case) is that when the home country affects p, it affects the foreign country’s net input price of 
biofuel as well.  In turn, this changes *R , and hence G .  Given that the foreign government is 
assumed to be passive,  
* * * * W
u Ge du X dp e G dR  and *RRRW  ,      (24) 
where WR is global crude use.25  The market-clearing equation for food is 
,0****  XXBeBeff pp        (25) 
which implies that 
                                                 
24 Note that production and consumption structure in both nations are the same as in section 2. The notation is 
similar, except that an asterisk refers to the foreign country. 
25 We relax this passivity assumption in the next subsection, where both nations may use biofuel subsidies.   
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),( tspp  .26           (26) 
Using (23) and (26), the optimal subsidy and tax levels are 
 * *( )s G s t G t t sopt
s t s t
Xp e G R R e G R Xp R
s
B R R B
     ,  0s t s tB R R B  ;    (27a) 
. *opt
opt t G t t
G
t
B s e G R Xpt e G
R
   .       (27b) 
       
Proposition 3:  A large open-economy’s optimal tax on crude will depart from the standard 
Pigouvian tax of the small open-economy case.  Also, even if an optimal tax on crude is in place, 
the optimal biofuel subsidy may be nonzero.   
 
  It is clear from an inspection of (27a) and (27b) that even if an optimal crude tax is in 
place, a biofuel subsidy is still required.  Consider for expositional purposes the case where SR is 
zero and sp is positive.  In this case, assuming that sB  is positive,
27 the optimal subsidy is 
positive if and only if the term sXp  is larger than 
*
G se G R .  The term sXp  is the standard terms-of 
trade effect, while *G se G R is home’s utility loss from increased crude use (and pollution) by the 
foreign country, induced by a rise in the price of food (and hence the price of biofuel) due to 
home’s subsidization.  These two effects are novel to the large-country case and explain why the 
optimal biofuel subsidy here departs from the zero level of the small-country case discussed in 
proposition 1.  In the small-country case, the only role of the biofuel subsidy is to target the 
domestic crude level ( R ).  When an optimal crude tax is in place, there is no reason to use the 
                                                 
26 The terms-of-trade effects are analyzed by using a quasi-linear utility function that is also separable in G .  This 
serves as a tractable example and does not compromise the generality of our results. 
27 In the appendix we show that while sB is necessarily positive in the small-country case, there is some ambiguity 
in the current context.  The conditions under which sB is positive is outlined on pages 21 and 22 in the appendix.   
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subsidy.  This is not true in the large-country case.  Even if the effect of a biofuel subsidy on 
domestic crude use is zero (i.e., if 0sR  ), there are still gains from using a biofuel subsidy.    
 Turning to the optimal tax on crude, it is clear from (27b) that the expression for the 
optimal tax here is different from Ge G  (which was the optimal tax level in the small-country 
case).  The expression differs because the tax here has three additional effects.  First, it affects 
the use of biofuel and therefore the burden of the subsidy to the extent .opttB s .  Second, by 
changing p, the price of crude relative to the net input price of *B is affected in the foreign nation.  
If this leads to an increase in foreign crude use (i.e., if * 0tR  ), then home utility is reduced.  
Finally, if the tax raises the price of food (i.e., if 0tp  ), then the home nation gains to the tune 
of tXp .
28   
 
3.2  Nash Biofuel Subsidies 
 Here we consider a scenario in which a crude tax is unavailable as a policy instrument, 
although home and foreign can both use biofuel subsidies.29  Each nation’s subsidy affects the 
net global demand for food and, hence the common international price of food.  Therefore, each 
country’s biofuel subsidy affects the other’s utility, raising strategic considerations for both 
nations.  We assume that the nations play Nash in the sense that each takes the other’s subsidy 
rate as given when choosing its own utility-maximizing subsidy.  The market-clearing equation 
(25) yields 
                                                 
28 The expression for pt is in the appendix.  Suffice it to note here that a tax affects the net global demand for food 
through various channels, including the substitution of biofuel for crude in energy production when crude becomes 
more expensive.  This effect by itself will tend to raise demand and the price of food, but there are countervailing 
effects.  For example, the tax raises the input price for energy production, in turn raising the energy price.  This will 
tend to reduce energy demand, which will reduce the derived demand for biofuel.  For details, we refer the reader to 
the appendix. 
29 This assumption lends tractability and allows us to focus better on the role of interdependence between nations in 
their choice of biofuel subsidies.  This is a relatively small sacrifice to make, because the fundamental insights of 
using a crude tax and biofuel subsidy combination have already been discussed.          
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),( *sspp  .          (28) 
Using (22) and (28), 
.Wu s s s G se u Xp sB e G R           (29) 
Assuming 0sB  (see footnote-26 and pages 21 and 22 for details), the Nash utility maximizing 
subsidy is 
 0
W
Nash s G s
s
Xp e G Rs
B
  , iff Ws G sXp e G R .      (30a) 
Analogously, we can derive the foreign subsidy rule.  In addition, using *X X  , we get 
* *
* * *
*
*
0
W
Nash s G s
s
X p e G Rs
B
  , iff ** *Ws G sXp e G R        (30b) 
The details of the terms-of-trade effects ( sp  and *sp ) are analyzed in the appendix.  
Suffice it to say here that one of the primary effects of a biofuel subsidy is to encourage the use 
of biofuel instead of crude.  This increases the demand for food (as biofuel) and raises its price 
regardless of which country is providing the subsidy.  Thus, both sp and *sp  are likely to be 
positive.  On the other hand, there is an asymmetry in the terms-of-trade effect on the utility of 
the two nations, because while home is an exporter of food (i.e., X > 0), foreign is an importer 
(i.e., * 0X X   ).  First, consider the case where WsR is negative.  Home subsidization reduces 
global pollution, and this benefit, coupled with the terms-of-trade gain, suggests that the Nash 
subsidy in (30a) is positive.  On the other hand, if the scale effect makes WsR  positive, the terms-
of-trade motive and the pollution-reduction motive conflict and a subsidy might or might not be 
justified.  Using (30b) we can see that analogous considerations suggest that the foreign country, 
which suffers from a terms-of-trade loss when it uses a biofuel subsidy, will subsidize only if its 
subsidy reduces pollution (i.e., only if * 0WsR  ).  The foreign country will choose a subsidy if the 
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aforementioned necessary condition is met, and if the pollution-reduction effect dominates the 
adverse terms-of-trade effect that the foreign nation imposes on itself. 
 It is easy to see from the discussion above that terms-of-trade considerations might lead 
the home country to choose a biofuel subsidy even when it increases pollution, and conversely, 
the foreign country may choose a tax even when its subsidy reduces pollution.  It is obvious that 
such an equilibrium is jointly suboptimal: the terms-of-trade effects wash out between the two 
nations while the pollution increase reduces joint welfare.  This is explained below by adapting 
equation (23) to the current context: 
 ** * * * * *( ) ( ) .Wu G Gue du e du X X dp sdB s dB e e G dR          (31a) 
Note that market clearing for food requires that 0*  XX .  Thus, (31a) simplifies to 
  ** * * * *( ) .Wu G Gue du e du sdB s dB e e G dR          (31b) 
Evaluating (31b) at the nonintervention outcome ( 0*  ss ) , and normalizing marginal utility 
of income for both nations to unity at this outcome  
* *
* 0( ) ( )
W
G Gs sd u u e e G dR      .       (32) 
It is clear that joint utility can rise only starting from nonintervention if global crude use falls, 
leading to less pollution.  Therefore, any policy intervention by either nation that leads to a net 
rise in crude use is jointly suboptimal.       
 
Proposition 4:  If biofuel subsidy reduces global pollution, terms-of-trade considerations imply 
that: (i) the Nash policy for the food exporter is to use a biofuel subsidy; and, (ii) the Nash policy 
of the food importer is a biofuel tax iff the terms-of-trade motive dominates the pollution-
reduction motive.  Such a Nash equilibrium is jointly suboptimal, and may or may not dominate 
the free trade outcome. 
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 The discussion preceding the proposition provides the proof.  It is clear from (32) that the 
Nash subsidy equilibrium may be associated with less pollution relative to free trade, which in 
turn implies that Nash intervention may dominate free trade.  On the other hand, a bad Nash 
equilibrium emerges when, for example, 0WsR  , * 0WsR  , and terms-of-trade motives dominate 
for both nations, so that home imposes a biofuel subsidy while foreign imposes a biofuel tax.  
Because 0WsR   and * 0WsR   in this case, the home subsidy and the foreign tax both raise 
pollution.  Clearly, in this case, the Nash equilibrium is worse than free trade.  The welfare 
ranking of other possible cases is not obvious, and one has to proceed on a case-by-case basis.     
 
4.  Conclusion 
 The main contribution of this paper is to provide a tractable general equilibrium analysis 
of biofuel subsdies (in the tradition of a neoclassical competitive trade model) to provide 
guidance on optimal policies under certain constraints.  Accordingly, most of the policies 
analyzed are of the second-best variety.  The lesson is not that these policies are actually 
observed in the real world, but that they can be a useful benchmark for the purpose of evaluating 
actual biofuel policies.  In reality, such policies are determined through a complex interplay of 
the economic and political objectives of respective governments.  A full-blown political 
economy model which provides a deeper look into such issues remains in our agenda for future 
research.     
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Appendix 
A.   Terms-of-Trade Effects  
 For tractability, we assume quasi-linearity of preferences and separability of G for this 
appendix.  These assumptions allow us to abstract from income effects, considerably simplifying 
the discussion, without changing the thrust of our analysis.  The general case is available on 
request.  Using equations (25) and (26) from the text, it can be shown that 
 ss F
Npp
s D
   ,         (A1) 
where 0FD  , because of the Marshall-Lerner condition, and 
  (.)s s sFs pq q q sp p pN e C E f L q EC    .        (A2) 
Noting that the concavity of the unit cost function in sector M ensures that ( )w q [defined in 
footnote 17] is convex, we get   
   0Mq qq q
EE e E
q
     because 0qqe   and 
 2( )( ) 0
( )
M M
q F
w q
E L w q
pf L
    .  (A3) 
Also, 
 ( ) 0
( )
F
q F
w qL
pf L
   because ( ) 0
M
M
Ew q
L
      
 and (.) 0f   .   (A4) 
Finally, 
 ( , ,1) 0ss pq C p s r t q C       .       (A5) 
Using (A3) through (A5) in (A2), and noting that (.)C is concave in input prices, 
  (.) 0s s sFs pq q q sp p pN e C E f L q EC      if  0pqe  .    (A6) 
(A6) provides a sufficient but not necessary condition for the biofuel subsidy to raise the 
international price of food.  Indeed, even if  pqe  is positive (i.e., food and energy are Hicksian 
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substitutes in consumption), the price of food will rise unless this cross-substitution effect in 
consumption overwhelms all the other effects.   
 The primary effect of the subsidy is to raise the use of biofuel as an input into energy at 
given prices.  This is captured by the term 0s sp pEC  .  The subsidy also reduces the price of 
energy because of a reduction in the unit cost (i.e., 0sq  ).  The lower energy price directly 
raises food demand if they are Hicksian complements (i.e., if 0pqe  ).  It also boosts the demand 
for energy for consumption and as an input in manufacturing, thereby raising the demand for 
food as an input in energy production:   0s Mqq q spC e E q  .  Finally, the lower energy input 
price expands the manufacturing sector at the expense of the food sector, driving down food 
supply: 0Fqf L   because 0FqL  .  All these effects contribute to a rise in the net demand for 
food (unless pqe  is positive and larger than the sum of the other effects), raising the price of food.  
This confers a terms-of-trade benefit to the home country as the exporter of food, and a loss to 
the foreign country. 
 Similarly, 
 tt F
Npp
t D
   ,         (A7) 
where, 
  (.)s s dFt pq q q tp p rN e C E f L q EC    ,        (A8) 
and, 
 (.) 0dt rq C  , 0s d s sp r p p
p sC C
r t
      .       (A9) 
Using equations (A3) to (A6), 
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 (.) 0s Fpq q qpe C E f L    if 0pqe  .           (A10) 
Using (A9) and (A10) in (A8), we see that while the first term on the right-hand side of (A8) is 
negative, the second term is positive.  Thus the sign of tN  is ambiguous.  This happens for the 
following reasons.  First, the tax raises the relative price of crude as an input and increases the 
input demand for biofuel (and, therefore, for the food product) via the cross-substitution effect.  
On the other hand, the remaining effects all reduce demand for food as follows: (i)  The crude 
tax raises the price of energy, which results in reduced consumption demand for food, if food and 
energy are Hicksian complements in consumption, (ii) The rise in the price of energy reduces the 
demand for energy, resulting in a decline in the derived demand for biofuel in energy production, 
(iii)  Since 0FqL  , the rise in the energy price raises home’s supply of food, reducing the excess 
demand for food.  
 If, in the final analysis, the effects of the induced change in energy price are dominated 
by the primary cross-substitution effect, then 0 0t tN p   .  The analysis for *sp is similar to 
that for sp  above.   
 
B.   Effects of Policy Variables on Biofuel and Crude Use  
 Noting that ( , ,1)C p s r t   is the unit cost function in the energy sector, CRS ensures 
that 
 ( , ,1)spB EC p s r t   .         (A11) 
Under quasi-linearity and separability in G, 
 ( , ) MqE e p q E  .         (A12) 
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Noting that ( )w w q , using ( )M ME L w q  from (A4), and using (2) and (4) [which yields 
( , )M ML L p w ], we get  
  ( , ) , ( ) ( )M M ME E p q L p w q w q   ,       (A13) 
where ( ) 0M Mp pE w q L   , and 0MqE   as shown in (A3).  
 Allowing for all the policy variables considered in this paper to be present, the market 
clearing equation for food dictates that 
 *( , , )p p s t s .          (A14) 
Using (A5), 
 ( , ,1) ( , , )q C p s r t q q p s t     ,  where       
 0sp pq C  ,   0ss ppq C q     , and 0dt rq C  .    (A15) 
Using (A12) through (A15), 
    *( , , ) (.), (.), , (.), (.), ,MqE E s t s e p q p s t E p q p s t         ,  
 where *(.) ( , , )p p s t s .         (A16) 
Using (A11) and (A16), 
 * *( , , ) ( , , ) ( (.) , ,1)spB s t s E s t s C p s r t   .       (A17) 
Using (A17) and simplifying, we get 
 ( ) ( ) (1 )s s s sM Ms qp p s s qq q sp p p pB C e E p C q e E EC p        .    (A18) 
In the small-country case, 0sp   and (A18) reduces to 
 ( ) 0s s sMs s qq qp p pB C q e E EC    ,        (A19)  
because of the concavity of expenditure and cost functions and because 0sq   and 0MqE  from 
(A3). 
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 Using (A18), it is clear that in the large-country case, if 1 0sp  , then 0sB   if the last 
term on the right-hand side of (A18) dominates or if 0qpe   and dominates the negative term 
M
pE .  
Similarly, using (A17), 
  s s s d st t tp p p r pB E C p C C E   ,  
 where ( ) ( )( ) 0M Mt qp p t qq q p t tE e E p e E q p q      , if 0tp  and 0qpe  .   (A20) 
In the small-country case, 0tp   and (A20) boils down to 
 s d st tp r pB EC C E  , ( ) 0Mt qq q tE e E q   .       (A21) 
The two terms on the right hand side of the first equality in (A21) have opposite signs.  
Therefore, the sign of tB  is ambiguous even in the small-country case.  Using (A20) we can infer 
that the same is true in the large-country case.   
 Analogous to (A11), 
 ( , ,1)drR EC p s r t   .         (A22) 
Using (A16), we can differentiate (A22) to obtain: 
  d d s d dt t tr r p r rR C E E C p C   ,        (A23)  
where tE is defined in (A20) above.  In the small-country case, 
   ( ) 0d d d d d dMt t qq q tr r r r r rR C E EC C e E q EC      .      (A24) 
Using (A23) and (A20) we can see that there is ambiguity in the large-country case, but 0tR   if 
the term  0d s tr pC p   is sufficiently small and if 0qpe  .  Using (A22) and (A16), 
 (1 )d d ss s sr r pR C E EC p   , 
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 where      M M Ms qp p qq q p s qq q sE e E e E q p e E q        .    (A25) 
In the small-country case, (A25) reduces to 
   d d sMs qq q sr r pR C e E q EC   .       (A26) 
Since   0d Mqq q srC e E q   and 0d sr pEC  , the sign of sR  is ambiguous even in the small-
country case. 
 Finally, consider foreign crude use *.R  Analogous to (A22), and noting that * 0t  , 
  * * * *( , ,1)rR E C p s r  .        (A27) 
Like (A16), 
    ** * * * * * * * *( , , ) (.), (.), (.), (.),MqE E s t s e p q p s E p q p s         ,  
 where *(.) ( , , )p p s t s .         (A28) 
Thus, 
  * ** * * * * * * * * *( , ,1) s ss s r s r srp rpR E C p s r E C p Z C E C p      
 where   * *s sE Z p ,  * * * ** * * * * *M Mp pq p q q qZ e E e E q         (A29) 
It is clear from (A29) that in the small-country case * 0sR  .  In the large-country case, the sign is 
ambiguous because * 0Z   if ** 0q pe  .  Similar derivations yield 
  ** * * * * st r trpR Z C E C p  .         (A30) 
Therefore, * 0tR   in the small-country case, whereas its sign is ambiguous in the large-country 
case.   
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